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L'ÉtrangerThe gentle indifference 14/11/2006 这些年来, 我使用的语言过于精确这些年来，我使用的语言过于精确，或者，更精确地说，我过于追求精确，我听到自己发出的声音与我想发出的声音相去如此之远，于是有一些本应当发出的声音，由于被预见到必会含糊，必会走调，而被埋没。我对文字的兴趣降低了，我对言辞的兴趣则仅限于用系统的论证说服评委和类似评委的人（至于某些事，“我不说你也知道”——但事实上我知道不是这样）。我将成为一个苍白的，沉默的形象。我甚至觉得第一人称已过于强调了这一形象的存在。今天在黑蓝上，我看到一句“在候车室我的感官功能灵敏，嗅觉出众”，就决定把整篇小说打印出来，在SU餐厅里我看到一个面貌甚丑的女子，穿着拖鞋，一只脚上缠着纱布，用另一只脚跳到柜台前，却又转身跳着离去……在我们必须借助名词和动词的语言里，你如何给它们（你也许会问，它们是什么？）一个名字，又如何称呼介于名词和动词之间的东西，如果它确实是某种东西？我的失败反过来加重了我对自己的无能的掩饰。我曾试图编造一些个故事，以退隐到自己背后，但这终究丧失了我当初站出来的意义。于是我对文字的兴趣降低了，我对言辞的兴趣则仅限于说服评委和类似评委的人（至于某些事，“我不说你也知道”——但事实上我私下做的假设正好相反）。我将成为一个苍白的，沉默的形象。我甚至觉得第一人称已过于强调了这一形象的存在。今天我忽然想到，在这四面环海的地方我已久未见到河流，未见过水向一个固定的方向持续流淌，图书馆外的夜晚则重复去年冬天的气息……在我们必须借助名词和动词的语言里，你如何给它们（你也许会问，它们是什么？）一个名字，又如何称呼介于名词和动词之间的东西，如果它确实是某种东西？我的失败也许应当归咎于我个人的无能，而这反过来加重了我对无能的掩饰。我曾想假手于一些个故事，一些允许或鼓励第三人称的虚构，以退隐到自己背后，但这终究丧失了我当初站出来的意义：你如何能掩盖起可笑的衣饰，同时却把身体暴露出来？于是我对文字的兴趣降低了，我对于言辞的兴趣仅限于用系统的论证说服评委和类似评委的人，对系统之外的，系统认为不必要的事，我纵有兴趣，也无能为力（“我不说你也知道”——但我知道不是这样）。我将成为一个苍白的，沉默的形象。我甚至觉得第一人称已过于强调了这一形象的存在。顺便说一下，我的相机是数码的，你可以毫不吝惜地从略微不同的角度为同一事物拍许多照片，然后从中挑选，直到眼花缭乱：现实竟可以如此众多地存在……在我们既拥有名词又拥有动词的语言里，你如何把它们（你也许会问，为什么是它们，它们不是同一个吗？）一一区别开来，又如何称能合乎语法地说“众多地存在”，却不同时承认众多地跑，众多地跳，众多地失去和得到？如果语言也可以在空间里并列，也许我就能够审慎地，精确地把它们一一排列，也许这样我的失败就不会再归于我个人的无能，which反过来加重了我对无能的掩饰。但，你如何能掩盖起可笑的衣饰，而同时把身体暴露出来？这既丧失掩盖的意义，也终究丧失了当初暴露的意义……
03/11/2006 Groundedness: Drawing the DefinitionPHIL 2120 Writing Exercise II
Give a definition of groundedness, and show how this is supposed to imply that the liar sentence is neither true nor false. Suppose we want to show that the sentences in Yablo's paradox are not grounded. Should your definition be modified? If so, how? If not, why not?
Groundedness: Drawing the Definition
It is accepted that a grounded statement is a statement capable of being true or false but not both. So one may naturally think of starting from the definition of truth.
Truth defined: Truth-value Function
In defining the concept of truth, Tarski takes the approach of defining the statement “p is true” as “if and only if p”. Whereas the “p” in the definiedum is a linguistic object expressed in the object language, the “p” in the definies, which he might call a state of affairs external to the object language, can only be expressed in the meta-language. This is the definition from which I will start.
The first step is to reformulate Tarski’s definition in the form of, so to speak, a Truth-value Function, f (x), where that p is true is expressed by f (p) =T, and that p is false by f (p) =F (assuming that T and F are the two and only two outputs in the range).
Tarski’s definition, in my view, correctly implies this: for a string of words to satisfy the domain of f (x), it must express a state of affairs ascertainable[1] within the meta-language, i.e. the language in which f (x) =T/F is expressed. Hence, when a string of words (e.g. “q: r is true”) speaks of not only an ascertained state of affairs but also the truth or falsity of another statement r, which is not an ascertained state of affairs as such but can be unfolded by applying f (x) to it, one must first unfold that statement, with the aim of converting it to a statement that does express an ascertained state of affairs at the end of the day.
In unfolding and ascertaining such a statement[2] there are two rules which, I dare suggest, are self-evident: (1) for any string in the form of f (p) =T/F to express a state of affairs, f (p) must first be ascertained; and (2), for f (x) to be ascertained, the string x (which may in turn take the form of f (x) =T/F) must first be ascertained. These two rules operate alternately until the whole statement is ascertained.
The Definition of Groundedness
In light of the above analysis I propose the following definition of groundedness: a string of words is grounded if and only if, when expressed in the form of Truth-value Function, it can be ascertained within finite steps. Otherwise it is ungrounded, and hence is neither true nor false.
This definition is essentially a normative one, yet I believe that it accommodates well the meaning of “to ground” in ordinary English.
Application
Applying the definition of groundedness, one can readily dispose of the Truth teller, “p: p is true”, as being neither true nor false. When reformulated into the form of f (x), the Truth teller first turns out to be “f (p) =T” and it contains p which is to be unfolded to “f (p) =T”, which unfortunately again contains p which is to be unfolded further. It is obvious that “p” and “f (p) =T” keep recurring alternately. Thus the two rules mentioned above are doomed to operate endlessly and the unfolding process can never be accomplished. Ultimately the best result is an infinite and never fully unfolded string in the form of f (f (...f (f (p) =T) =T...) =T), which cannot be ascertained within finite steps. It is therefore ungrounded (and it does not satisfy the domain of a true Truth-value Function at all!).
Likewise the Liar “L: L is false” will ultimately end up being f (f (...f (f (p) =F) =F...) =F). The only difference, that the “T” in the case of the Truth teller is replaced here by “F”, cannot make anything more ascertainable. Therefore, the Liar is ungrounded too.
The strengthened Liar can be disposed of in the same way as well, by reformulating “L1: L1 is not true” to be ¬f (¬f (...¬f (¬f (p) =T) =T...) =T): here “¬” adds nothing material just as “T” or “F” in the previous cases. So for the same reason it is ungrounded. One cannot argue that, since L1 is not true and is not false, it is true after all because it does state that “it is not true”. That the strengthened Liar in fact states nothing is a complete answer to that argument.
The same can be said as to Yablo’s sequence[3]. Although each of the statements in the sequence is not self-referential, it cannot be ascertained within finite steps anyway. (Moreover, one may still argue that the sequence as a whole is self-referential, although not directly.)
The most problematic aspect of my definition of groundedness lies in laying down the rules by which a string of words can be reformulated into the prescribed form, f (x): they are not all that clear as they have appeared to be in the above cases. Unfortunately there is no room here for further enquiry.
[1] When saying a state of affairs is “ascertainable” I am using the word “ascertain” in its ordinary meaning.
[2] In this essay by “ascertaining” a string of words or a statement I mean the ascertaining of the state of affairs that this string of words or statement purports to state.
(S1) All the sentences below from (S2) onwards are not true.
(S2) All the sentences below from (S3) onwards are not true. (S3) All the sentences below from (S4) onwards are not true. ... (Sn) All the sentences below from (Sn+1) onwards are not true. ... Yablo’s sequence is infinite; and he argues that, whatever truth value is assigned to S1, any sentence from S3 onwards are paradoxically both true and false. The point he tries to illustrate by this sequence is that Liar-like paradoxes are not necessarily self-referential, as he takes the view that the sentences in his sequence are independent from each other and that the sequence in nowhere refers to itself.
26/10/2006 论三联书店的倒掉由隶属于杭州市文化广电新闻出版局的杭州市文化市场行政执法总队办公室2006年8月21日编发的第69期《稽查快报》披露：6月21日至23日，总队积极配合杭州市公安局经济文化保卫支队，联合查处了杭州生活读书新知三联书店违法经营政治性非法出版物案件，共收缴《晚年周恩来》、《党史笔记》、《邓力群自述：十二个春秋》、《毛泽东私人医生回忆录》等非法政治性书刊4种426本。总队与公安机关已就此案成立专案组展开全面调查，追踪来源，全力追缴已流向社会的部分政治性非法出版物。
以上四种非法出版物，感兴趣的也不妨留意追缴一下。
在我们这个法治国家，书被查抄，或者人被带走，本不是什么特别令人惊奇的事。但这两则消息令我有点额外的感触。在杭一年，三联我去过多次，买回来而看不懂的书现今一一在家陈列着，只当陈列那段本应感到幸福的时光。丁东的名字我知道得更早，初中时看他的《反思历史不宜迟》，和张远山《永远的附庸风雅，永远的风花雪月》，险些儿被转化成自由主义接班人。这么看来，给他安那个罪名其实是不无道理的。
如今正常出版、被正常阅读的书里，其作者曾经坐监乃至早被杀头的，不在少数。但一名曾经正常出版、曾经被正常阅读的作者，有一日忽然有了坐监的可能，这确实是很异样的感觉。
还是鲁迅问的，莫非他们造塔的时候，竟没有想到塔是终究要倒的么？
09/10/2006 存档以表明丽华体之所以是丽华体并不仅仅因为它是丽华体
--------------------
瞄准/京不特
我从五岁开始练瞄准
那时我瞄准苹果
后来苹果都让我吃了
不应当瞄准苹果
苹果是无辜的
瞄准世界吗
世界是无辜的
它甚至比枪出现得更早
杀人犯是无辜的
因为他们不得不杀人
这就像国家经济计划
走错一步就不得不赔钱
当官的是无辜的
都是因为不得不这样
他们才这样
我不去瞄女人
她们是母亲和妻子
瞄准她们就是瞄准人道主义
再说哪一天
我也会有老婆
那么把枪口对准自己
我也是无辜的
因为我不得不瞄准
03/10/2006 On Certainty 461PHIL 2120 Writing Exercise I Write 2 or 3 pages (500-750 words) on one of the following topics. Topic 2: What is Wittgenstein trying to say in On Certainty 461? Do you agree with Wittgenstein? Why or why not?
On Certainty 461
What it says At the first glance, OC 461 poses the question which it later answers: can a sentence with the form of a piece of information not be a real piece of information? Wittgenstein answers affirmatively and suggests that this happens when “[t]he background is lacking”. If “being a piece of information” can -- and in my view it really should -- be taken as to mean “having meaning”, or “not being nonsense”, then this point in OC 461 is precisely the same one which is more fully elaborated in OC 349 (and in other places as well). There he shows how words are deprived of meaning unless they are employed in a certain context. This observation, however, deals with the certainty of the meaning of words rather than what is meant.
It is on the latter point that OC 461 has gone farther: it seems that, by asking “how can he be certain of what he says”, Wittgenstein rejects the patient’s assertion as nonsense not only on the ground that it lacks certain background, but also on the ground that it is probably based on a different “world-picture”. By “world-picture” he means the set of propositions which one does not doubt but base his doubts on (see OC 167). The reasoning behind, as I formulate, may be this: if in certain circumstances (here, a patient approaching a doctor with two obvious hands) a sane person does feel the necessity of proving or asserting something that we do not doubt or even think of, then we may well suspect that that person has in his mind a wholly different world-picture; and if this is true, then there may be no possibility at all of mutual understanding or dialogue between him and us on certain matters, for he may question our fundamental, unfounded beliefs and we may question his; -- and, if this is true, then certainly we cannot be certain of what his world-picture is (see also OC 231). As we cannot ascertain his starting point, we will surely not understand too how he can “be certain of what he says”, which is the very thing that raises our suspicion, namely, the assertion of the existence of his hands.
With the above analysis, what Wittgenstein is trying to illustrate may be expressed as the follows: it is wrong, or rather, beyond our understanding, to either attack or defend the world-picture of the “community” (see also OC 298), which is however something not fixed but floating. Indeed he does say elsewhere that anyone who does so may be regarded as “intellectually very distant” from us (OC 108), unless he later shows us within our world-picture why he has done so and thereby makes himself understood (see also OC 468, 469).
Comments I agree with Wittgenstein on his observation of the “world picture” and the intellectual distance between an ordinary mind and a philosophical, or rather, sceptical mind. I say observation because these indeed are to be observed, somehow intuitively. Even an ordinary person in his daily life can do so, though perhaps to a less extent, e.g. he learns how difficult it sometimes is to persuade old people, or young kids, etc.
Apart from the intuitive observation, Wittgenstein’s argument, as I have formulated, is valid and compelling (I do not say sound for reasons too long to explain here). If one agrees that it is justified to suspect the patient in OC 461 to have a different world-picture, he can hardly avoid the conclusion that it is also justified to dispose of philosophical doubts, e.g. scepticism, as beyond our understanding, by which Wittgenstein means nonsense.
However, this approach at least in the above analysis will not satisfy everyone who wishes to defeat the sceptics on the question of certainty. If Wittgenstein had ever endeavoured to do so he would be dealing with questions such as “where two world-pictures appear to be nonsense to each other, is it always justified to assert one’s own?” He probably would reject such questions as nonsense in the first place: it appears to be his starting point to always assert the world-picture of the doctor, i.e. of the community, and confine the question of certainty as a matter of world-picture and the express of it (see also OC 456-458). Thus, his argument is not open to any criticism from outside of common sense and can criticise scepticism no more than saying that they are nonsense, for where players are not in the same court, there is no game. ---------------
On Certainty 461. Suppose that I were the doctor and a patient came to me, showed me his hand and said: “This thing that looks like a hand isn't just a superb imitation--it really is a hand” and went on to talk about his injury--should I really take this as a piece of information, even though a superfluous one? Shouldn't I be more likely to consider it nonsense, which admittedly did have the form of a piece of information? For, I should say, if this information really were meaningful, how can he be certain of what he says? The background is lacking for it to be information. 349. “I know that that’s a tree”--this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says “that is a shrub”; I say it is a tree.--We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says “I know that that's a tree”. Someone wants to test my eyes etc. etc.--etc. etc. Each time the ‘that’ which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind. But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: “I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly.”--Let us even suppose I had made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and now, out of all context, I repeat it while looking at the tree, and I add “I mean these words as I did five minutes ago”. If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about the remark. For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it. 167. It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm of description. Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that takes place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world-picture--not of course one that he invented: he learned it as a child. I say world-picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned. 231. If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not. 298. ‘We are quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education. 108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it. For this demands answers to the questions "How did he overcome the force of gravity?" "How could he live without an atmosphere?" and a thousand others which could not be answered. But suppose that instead of all these answers we met the reply: "We don't know how one gets to the moon, but those who get there know at once that they are there; and even you can't explain everything." We should feel ourselves intellectually very distant from someone who said this. 468. Someone says irrelevantly "That's a tree". He might say this sentence because he remembers having heard it in a similar situation; or he was suddenly struck by the tree's beauty and the sentence was an exclamation; or he was pronouncing the sentence to himself as a grammatical example; etc., etc. And now I ask him "How did you mean that?" and he replies "It was a piece of information directed at you". Shouldn't I be at liberty to assume that he doesn't know what he is saying, if he is insane enough to want to give me this information? 469. In the middle of a conversation, someone says to me out of the blue: "I wish you luck." I am astonished; but later I realize that these words connect up with his thoughts about me. And now they do not strike me as meaningless any more. 456. If, therefore, I doubt or am uncertain about this being my hand (in whatever sense), why not in that case about the meaning of these words as well? 457. Do I want to say, then, that certainty resides in the nature of the language-game? 458. One doubts on specific grounds. The question is this: how is doubt introduced into the language-game? 01/10/2006 以梦为马暑假产物，掰不下去了
睡行者伊拉，或以梦为马
法拉比·阿尔-阿克萨尼，人称睡行者伊拉，众所周知，他是十二世纪最骁勇善战的梦游者。相传他从二十三岁起便陷入梦游状态，身背两口马刀，骑一匹时刻处于睡梦状态的黄马，追随萨拉丁的旗帜辗转于耶路撒冷与开罗之间。闲时他独坐营帐，用密合的睫毛把马刀打磨得如同两弯新月，战时则两刀交替使用，以免刀刃卷损过度。他的马鞍后面拴着一本书脊脱落的古兰经，每到一条河流，他便坐下来在河畔阅读。同所有梦游者一样，伊拉读书时不用把书打开，据说他们的目光能穿透重重书页一如穿透自己的眼睑。另据传说，有一次敌人趁他读书时从背后发动偷袭，伊拉不动声色，举书挡下飞矢，而书本身却毫发无损…… 与伊拉在军旅生涯中留下的丰富事迹相比，对他的早年我们知之甚少。一开始，除了他曾是爱资哈尔清真寺里勤勉的学生之外，人们甚至不知道他姓甚名谁。回历566年秋天，那是反攻埃及的前夜，在吹度红海的风中，亲随兵士看到睡行者用指甲在其中一把马刀上刻下伊拉一词，从此这便成了他在营中的名字。这名亲随回忆此事时写道，伊拉刻字的手法异常温柔，如同爱抚恋人的脸，后来他曾拿起另一把马刀，但这次他的指甲犹豫不决。 回历587年，阿拉伯人克服圣城，春日里宣礼声声，暗中传递着基督徒即将卷土重来的讯息。伊拉策马来到约旦河岸，但这一次，他没有像往常一样坐下来读书，而是喃喃地念出了马刀上所刻的名字。然后他睁开了眼。谁也不曾想到，一生的梦游与征战到此即告结束。数十年来，伊拉的面容一直保持着当初入梦时的模样，睁开眼后他开始迅速衰老，终于在当日黄昏赶上了岁月的正常步伐。第二天清晨，早起的人们有幸目睹他正在迅速腐败分解的尸体，晚起的人则只看到空空如也的营帐。在他身后流传的诸多记载中，有一份手稿自称是伊拉在醒来当夜所写，尽管其真实性饱受质疑，但事情往往如此，平淡的事实迅速沉没，而离奇可疑的事物则历久弥新，漂浮于岁月长河的表面。 手稿连同其中涂改与字迹不清之处，都一并转抄如下：
[最皎洁的月影投于黑暗的湖水，一如最难忘的瞬间属于懵懂的灵魂]……我生于蒙昧，也将死于混沌，感谢真主，在此期间两度赋予我专注于事物的能力。第一次是在人人皆有的少年时代。唉，我已全然不记得那时自己在想些什么，但有多少次啊，美好的事物蓦然闯入心灵，留下永难磨灭的印记，而日后所有的触动都不过是对年少时某次触动的回忆。可惜，眼下我的记忆正以数百倍于往常的速度衰退，即便记忆纤毫不爽，我的文辞也不能追述其万一…… 不过即便在那个时期，异常的征象便偶有显现。我的眼睛看着面前说话的人，目光则如解缆的船只，滑过他们肩头，漂向他们身后的墙壁，窗帘，或那随风变幻的阴影里去。我也曾在高高的宣礼他塔上眺望那个渐行渐近的身影，也曾在[开罗]市集上看着它被人潮吞没。那些时刻我的头脑停止了思想，空无一物而又异常充盈。可一旦注视的对象消失，街市上过于丰富的声音、色彩和气息便一拥而入，如同入睡前一连串毫无关联的形象在我的头脑中肆意流动，我便在一阵餍足似的恶心中踅回斗室里去。 来到爱资哈尔后，我不再能见到她。绘有正方形图案的正方形地毯铺满整个清真寺，在地毯四角拼合处，无穷无尽的正方形涌现出来，令我头晕目眩。我开始长久地注意诸如图书室地面的一处隆起，两块镜子接壤处事物的变形，以及我卧室天花板上一条仿佛要割裂我的神经的缝隙。在书架前我把书脊的纹理与记忆中喷泉四周的水纹相比较，在庭院里我则把喷泉四周的水纹与记忆中某本书书脊的纹理相比较。有时我对这种比较忍无可忍，不得不伸手掩住书脊，可对于水纹我奈何不得…… 每天授课的时间并不固定，主麻日的仪礼更是复杂。一切安排都用粉笔对称地公布在藏书室两面石壁上。但我无法集中精神去理解那些简单字词的意思。确切地说，我集中不了足够长的时间。石头上的粉笔迹唤起对于秋日鱼鳞状云朵的联想。数字对我则意味着一笔画问题、一神教与二进制的潜在矛盾，一日五次宣礼与五等分圆作图，以及联亚历山大也未能征服的印度。至于文字，它们于我曾是何等熟稔，何等亲切，现在却变得困难重重。面对长句，我不能自已地把它层层分解，以期发现真主创造的、完美而永恒的语法。短句，尤其是使用了指代或倒序的简洁语句，则令我惊讶不已，一读再读。我的结论是它们必系直接出自真主之手，并在心里默默地证明：因为惟有真主方能凌驾于他所创造的语法之上……但为了周全起见，我必须考虑，这样做是否与真主的本性相符，以及在逻辑上是否自洽，事实上，连真主与逻辑的关系都是悬而未决的，比如，逻辑是否能证明它自己的亵渎性质……阅读便是这样一个支离破碎的过程，往往直到读到最后一行，我才发现自己早已迷失在无穷分岔的歧途中而不知所云。惟在夜深不寐，面对着天花板上那条裂缝时，我才稍感宽慰，久而久之，我觉得裂缝才是实体，而墙壁只是实体产生的幻象，正如车辙是实体而道路是幻象，墨迹是实体而字母词句是幻象，前者是纯粹的形式，剥夺一切思考的余地，而后者我总要费一番力气才能辨认出来……
[我记得]那是爱资哈尔第二年夏天的一个主麻日，伊玛目伊本·哈里里正在讲道。[伊本·哈里里以发表关于灵魂的奇谈怪论著称，比如灵魂在睡梦中比在清醒时更为专注，又如灵魂不能独自测度时间，惟有与另一灵魂互相参照才能感觉到时光飞逝，等等。]当时他的胡子在壁龛的阴影里抖动，而我则沉溺于壁龛顶部蓝白相间的尖拱，线条与色彩如同堤坝抵挡着意识之外的洪水。忽然，一个微弱的，仿佛街市上某个车轮陷入泥辙的声音，从门外穿过礼堂，传入我的耳朵。霎时间，我仿佛看到我的精神犹如被穹顶那圈小窗粉碎成千万道的阳光，一方一方射进寺来，照亮无尽的正方形，圆形，荡开的波纹，墨迹与石头的纹理，照亮干涸的泥辙，陷在辙中吱吱作响的轱辘，照亮难以名状的广大，繁复与渺小之感。阳光照亮了伊玛目伊本·哈里里的胡子，但我不知道他在说些什么……
...掰不下去了
04/08/2006 正午的浴室Canon EF 50/1.8 II，AF TV: 1/80s AV: f/4.0 ISO: 100 第一幅为1:4.2缩略图，其下依次为1:1.7，1:1，1.3:1，1.9:1和4.0:1截图
21/07/2006 日光底下, 并无新字04年写的，删了最后一段
在十八岁上读《厌恶》，不知是太早，还是太迟了。“一切存在之物都是毫无理由地生出来，由于软弱而继续活下去”，这比生命意志之类的理论更简洁，更透彻，或者不如说，更符合我的意思。 闭上眼睛，我们看到的不是一片纯净的黑暗。统一的色调中有微妙的差别，勾勒出某种隐约的，变幻的图像。但当我定睛注视它，试图看清它时，它便消散。理由和意义也是如此，当我问，我为什么在这里，的时候，它便成了碎片，无法收拾。 莫干山路清晨的梧桐，树根附近拱起的人行道，微寒的风，这就是我发问的场景。事实上，在我独自离开房间，来到清冷的街上之前，甚至在我到达杭州之前，我便设想过与这个问题配合的场景，比如在下榻处的入口，在火车站的人潮中。后来，在候车室外，当苍白的太阳落到高架的护栏上，向涌动的人海坠去时，我确实又问了一遍。“我为什么在这里？”在这陌生的城市，我完成了一件确曾征得我的同意，却又像是迫我去做的事情，这个时刻，我认识的人们都在两百公里之外，度过星期日的下午。而我站在此地，眼睛疲惫地反映着夕阳和人海，考虑，也许不能说是考虑，只是听凭这么一个问题，占据我的头脑。 陌生的场合容易引发这个问题，但并非只有在陌生的场合。我现在身处（根据台阶的高度和数目估算）离地约三十米的半空，囿于约一百六十立方米的空间内。这是怎么回事？如果钢筋，水泥，砖石和木材一下子都变得像空气一样透明，而质地依然坚硬，我便可以看到人们如何在空气中忙碌，看他们像托起皇帝的新衣一样，俯在曾是窗台的地方，或者捏着钥匙在虚无中转动。你的上铺有人，下铺也有人。——这定能给人以某种启示。 2.4
------------------------------- 已写的字，后必再写 已读的字，后必再读 日光底下，并无新字
13/07/2006 存照---------------------------------------------------------------- 刚看到，《哈扎尔辞典》226页：
……这就好比我们听不到大路的声音，那是因为有马车的声音。哈扎尔人认为倘若你居住在某人的过去，那你就会被那人的记忆缠住，就好比你遭囚禁、受到诅咒一样；你再也无法改变任何东西，你的所作所为只能重复过去，你只能遇上你早就见过面的人，你甚至不会增岁变老……
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